it in so simple an operation as the extraction of a tooth ; ancl a jury would be doing its full duty in holding responsible for the death of the patient any physician or dentist who administered it in such a case, with a fatal result. OKE OF THE DIFFICULT problems which presents itself for solution in the south is how to reduce the mortality arnong the blacks. That it has not yet been solved is iuacle evident by a study of the ~i t a l statistics of southern cities. These records show that the death-rate of the negroes is double that of the whites. Savannah, Qa., however, seems to be exceptionally unllealthg in this regard. I t is stated that in that city, while the rate for the white population is but 12.19 per thousancl, a remarkably low rate ancl probably not correct, that for the blaclrs is 1%. If these Figures are correct, there is opportunity for nluch missionary work of a sanitary nature in the city of Savannah.
ECONOITIIC LAWS AhD JIETHODS.
IF it should be said that the material out of which the science of mechanics was built was woocl and stone, iron and steel, every one would see the mistalre. But when Mr. H. C. Adams, in his interesting paper on econonlics and jurispruclence, speaks of the material surroundings of nlen ancl the legal structure of society as material out of which the science of economics is built, he falls into precisely the same error (Science, July 2).
I t would be unfair to Mr. Adams personally to lay too much stress on a ranclom expression torn from its context ; but it is not unfair to the school of thought to which he belongs. We have singled this expression out for criticism because it is characteristic of the school. I t represents a view of the whole subject which is likely to lead to graTe mistakes in thinking and in action. That ;Mr. Aclams himself will make those inistakes, we do not believe. W e should be sorry to say a word which should even seem to detract from the value of his work. He is one of the few inen who combine originality with critical judgment. But the high character of the writer makes it all the more necessary to protest against his mistakes, even though they be but incidental. What he does inadvertently, others will be led to do d-eliberately.
The error lies in confounding the material to which a science is apphed, with the material out of which it is built ; or -to put the same thing in another form -in identifying the material of a POL. VIII., No. 180 science with the materials of an art. I n itself this may seem a trivial matter ; in its consequences i t is extremely serious.
The nlaterial out of which the science of mechanics is built is not wood or iron, in any sense whatever. The science is built out of a few simple laws of motion, no~vhere exactly lealizecl in nature, ancl yet now admittecl by every sensible man to be true. And in like manner the illaterial out of which the science of economics is built consists of a few simple laws of human nature, the chief of which is that men strive to obtain the inaxin~um of satisfaction with the mininlunl of sacrifice. I t does not insist that the sacrifice shall be solely physical, or the satisfaction purely material. I t makes no illore unmarrantecl assumptions than does pure mechanics. The ' economic man' has as much and as little real existence as the ' material point.' As the funclarnental assumptions of nlechanics are involved in the definition of motion and the fact of its measurement, so the fuiidamental assumptions of political economy are involred in the definition of motives, ancl the fact of their measuren~ent. This measurement is far less accurate in moral science than in physical science : the danger of dognlatisnl is therefore greater, and the need for verification more I-onstant. But to say that the verification is the science, is as mnch a mistake in the one case as in the other. I t is a mistake which is often made, and which does great harm, both in science and in practice. I t defeats the usefulness of verification as a means of discovery. An illustration will help to make this clear. The discovery of Neptune was due to a study of the motions of Uranus. I t was found that these nlotions mere not exactly such as the laws of mechanics, allplied to the position of the known planets, would explain. I t was therefore assumed that there must be certain unknown conditions which entered into the case ; and careful reasoning led to the cliscorery of a new planet, whose position and size fulfilled those conditions. Now, let it be observecl, that, by the methocl which the historical school so highly commends, the inference from the nlotions of Uranus woulcl simply have been that the law of gravitation zccts not a s rigid a s is conzmonly supposed. Such an inference ~vonld not merely have been wrong in itself, but it ~~o u l c l have prevented the discovery of Neptune.
I t is oilly when you assume a rigid law that your ~erification leads to new discoveries ; and it leacls to the illost fruitful cliscoveries where the lam at first seenls to fail. That these new discoveries may sometimes take such a form that the old statement of the law will need to be partly or wholly rejected, does not alter the case. The man who tries to reason without rigid hypotheses cripples liis power of inrestigation. Any one who understands the real power and importance of verification is justly indignant at any such conception of science as will prevent the use of verification as a meana of discocery. The failu~es of the attempt to morlr without rigid hypotheses, from Lord Bacon down, h a~e been so conspicuous that they hardly need repetition. Where the Gernlan school of economists has made any advance in the field of political economy itself, it has been done by a n abandonment of the so-called historical method, and by a rigid application of deducti7.e reasoning combined with careful verification. I t is Cohn, and not Roscher, who represents the really fruitful line of Gernlan thought ; and, whatever Cohn may at times have professed, he relies strongly both on abstract reasoning and on the rigidity of law.
There is one class of cases where these clistinctions fall away, and where the Baconian i~iethod is a good one. When a science ia so crude as to be niainly occupied with description and classificatio.1, tlieit~ is little chance for the use of rigid 1i-j-potheses. Here the distinction between the material and the science falls away. Physics remained in this conclition till the seventeenth cent u r y ; chemistry. till the eighteenth ; itwas not till the nineteenth that 'naturall~istory ' began to give place to biology.
Sociology as a whole can llarclly be said to have advanced beyond this stage ; but certain depait-n~e n t s of sociology are distinctly beyond it, notably law and political economy. They 1ia.r e reached the pomt where it is possible to frame hypotheses and to carry out deductions ancl verifications. The field of each science is liinited ; but, within its proper sphere, each is a trnc science. I t is right enough to say that each is a part of something greater. I n the future me may hope that a scientific sociology ~x-ill be cleveloped which shall include many other sciences. But sve have a sclence of politici?l economy, and we have not as yet a science of sociology in any tiling like the same sense. To reject the part which me have for the sake of the whole, which me have not, would be the extreme of folly. I t would be the same tEnng as to have rejected the undulatory theory of light fifty years ago because the correlation of forces mas not yet discovered. The theory of light was but a part of the truth ; but it was only on the basis of such parts that the whole could be built up. d scientific part is a better starting-point than an unscientific whole.
There is another class of dangers to ~vliich we are exposed when we deny all independence to economic reasoning. The man or state that refuses to recognize the rigidity of econon~ic laws is likely to suffer for it, sooner or later, in his practical experience. I t is impossible for a man not to let his habits of thought affect his habits of action. If he is accustomed to malie rigid assumptions, he tries to nlalie things conforni to these assumptions, and to insist that something is wrong where they do not. If, on the other hand, he reasons loosely, lie comes to act recklessly, and to believe that his own l~~c l i or skill wilt sas7e hinl from the necessity of careft11 calculation. The error of reckless overconfidence is at once inore destructive and more colilnion than the error of fatalism ; and any thing which encourages the former is usually more dangerous than that which encourages the latter.
If a nearly spent cannon-ball is slowly rolling toward you, the natural and sensible thing to do is to get out of the way. The fatalist may refuse to do so because of his blind belief in fate. The fool nlay refuse to do so because he thinks it is not coming fast enough to hurt hirn. Now, either extreme is bad ; but the practical danger is from the latter. The experience of army surgeons will show that in the instance given there are probably ten fools to one fatalist.
And in like manner the danger of believing that economic laws can be interfered with by human effort is ten times greater than the danger of a n extreme belief in laissez-fair.& I l u n~a n nature is far inore inclined Lo the former error. Where the econoinists make a niistalre in opposing state interference (as when they tried to stop English factory legislation), people ill generally take their own course in spite of them. Where they make the niistalre of not opposing it, people will be only too ready to seize upon their arguments. And the same thing holds true of individual action as well as of state action. The danger of belies~ing that the results of past experience are uncertain is far grcater than the danger of believing that we are helplcss to improve upon them.
As a matter of fact, there are limits within which the results of past experience are surprisingly rigid. That the worse currency drives out the better ; that food prices depend upon the margin of cultivation rather than upon rent ; that reclrless marriage means starvation wages, -are laws which nations have been for centuries attempting to disregard, and of which they are hardly yet learning the full force. They mark limits, and effective limits, upon 1egislatis.e activity. As long as political economy is occupied with defining those limits, it can maintain its claim to tlie position of an authoritative science. I t says to tlie legislator, ' Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.' I t does not say, ' Such and such legislation will procluce the best results ;' but it says, ' Beyond certain limits, all legislation fails.' This is the natural relation of a science to an art. Mechanics does not tell the bridge-builder exactly horn he must builcl his bridge ; considerations of beauty ancl convenience must be taken into account: but mechanics warns the builder, that, if he disregards certain conditions of stabii~ty, his bridge mill fall. Nobody insists that the axioms of mechanics should be modified because a bridge with the inaxiinunl of stability moulcl be inconrenient or unsafe. Nor clo we insist that nxechanics ~h o u l d solre all the problems of bridgebuilding. TVe let mechallical considerations limit the practical application of aesthetics, and we let aesthetic consiclerations limit the practical application of mechanical principles. We do not attempt to fuse the two things together, and then distrust both of them.
This may fairly illustrate the relation of economics and jurisprudence. Whether we shall ever be able to conlbine them into one science may be uncertain ; but me have not been able to do so as ~e t . Each limits the practical application of the other. Industrial a c t i v i t~ is limited by legal conditions ; legislative activity, by economic conditions. The attempt to confuse the two, and to merge them in a crude science of sociology, seems for the present likely to check scientific progress, and to inrolre us in serious practical dangers. Each, as a science, is independent, autl~oritati\-e, and rigid ; each forms the basis of an art which is subject to a thousand limitatione. ARTHUR T. HADLEY.
C'ONVOCATION OF THE UATIVERSI'I'17 OF
THE STATE 03' KETT7 P'ORK. TEE twenty-fourth convocation of the University of the state of New York began its sessions in the senate chamber of the capitol at Albany on Tuesday rnorning. July 6. There was assellibled a large number of college professors, normal and high school teachers, and friends of education, from Kew york and other states.
The address of Hon. Henry R. Pierson, chancellor of the unirersity, was a rery able and eloquent ciefence of the mork of the university and its board of regents, having special reference to the proposal recently made to abolish thein both. Tile chancellor examined in some detail t l~e history and organization of Oxford, Cambridge, and Lonclon universities. He showed that these mli~yersities stand in precisely the same relation to the federated colleges under their control that the University of the state of ;'u'e\i7 York bears to the [VOL. VIII., No. 180 high schools, academies, and colleges of the state. The history of the university amply justifies its existence. Starting in 1784 with only one v e a k college -King's college, now Coluinbia -under its control, it e~nbracecl, in 1883. 45 colleges having 784 instructors and 11,70",ttndents, and 1,571 sradnates during the year. The total value of this college propeity is $23,164,612.82, and their yearly expenditure amounts to $1.78T,391.51. Besides this, there mere, in 1885, 283 acadeiilies under the control of the regents of the nnirersity, and 72,426 answer-payers mere examined and passed upon under tile supervision of the regents during the year. The chancellor stated that post-gracluate courses, with corresponding examinations and degrees, n-ere now under consideration. He conclnrled, " Read the record of these conrocations, and I ~e n t u i e to say that no similar records of educational value can be fo~und. Sl~all me consider these convocations a failure and nothing vorth P It is true, the uni~~ersit-does not confer nlany degiees, because that is a power concurrent with the colleges, and it has bsen thought best to leave that duty mainly with them. I think I ha7 e proreii that in its past and present the duties of the unirelsity hare been defined by law, and that it has pertorilled all the dutles d e~~o l~i n g upon it ;
that the corporate name is not a n~isno~ller, and should not misleacl ; and that the regents are doing too noble a mork to be abolished or merged n ith any other body of educational morliers."
The main interest of the first morning session centred in the discussion of the subject of manual training,-\~~hich was introduced in a paper by Principal Lo\ e of Samestown. Mr. Lore clainled that the test of the practicability of manual training lllust be its usefulness. Any system of training that does not start out with the idea that the scholar must beconle a producer is defective. Principal Lore detailed the ~vorkings of a system of manual training introduced by him in Jamestown, asserting that it did not detract from, hut rather added to, the quantity and quality of intellectual work performed by the pupils. His account sho~xyed a gratifjing success ~v i t h an experinlent which must sooner or later become general.
The afternoon sessioil was g i~e n u p to a discussion of the question, ' Has tlie college a logical place in the Xnlerican sy.,tem of etiucation ? ' The subject was introcluced by papeis by Prof. Oxen Root of Hamilton college and Prof. S. 0.Williams of Conlell. Both essayi~ts, as ~r e l l as T'ice-Clmncellor 3IacCrackeil of the Uni~ersity of the city of S e w York, who opened the discussion of the papers, combated the T iem expressed in sonle cluarters, -notably by Plofessor West of Princeton, in a paper read before the Kational teachers' associa-
